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Introduc)on	  to	  Cryptography	  
Gary	  C.	  Kessler	  
Vermont	  Internet	  Crimes	  Against	  Children	  Task	  Force	  
Burlington,	  VT	  
April	  26,	  2012	  
Webinar	  InformaBon	  
•  All	  aDendees	  will	  be	  muted.	  	  	  
•  If	  you	  desire	  to	  ask	  a	  quesBon,	  please	  use	  the	  
quesBons	  secBon	  of	  the	  GoToWebinar	  dialogue	  
box,	  typically	  in	  the	  upper	  right	  corner	  of	  the	  
screen.	  	  	  
•  Please	  do	  not	  raise	  your	  hand	  for	  quesBons	  we	  
can	  not	  unmute	  you.	  
•  The	  quesBons	  will	  either	  be	  answered	  directly	  by	  
a	  panelist	  or	  asked	  to	  the	  presenter	  who	  will	  
answer.	  	  
2 
•  Poll	  quesBons	  may	  be	  asked	  during	  the	  
webinar.	  	  They	  will	  be	  leL	  open	  only	  a	  short	  
period	  of	  Bme	  so	  please	  respond	  promptly.	  
Webinar	  InformaBon	  
Webinar	  InformaBon	  
•  At	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  webinar	  a	  short	  
survey	  will	  appear.	  	  Please	  complete	  it	  
before	  signing	  off.	  
•  A	  link	  to	  view	  the	  recorded	  webinar	  and	  the	  
Powerpoint	  slides	  will	  be	  provided	  to	  you	  
via	  email	  aLer	  the	  webinar.	  
3 
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Overview	  
•  GOAL:	  Introduce	  terms,	  concepts,	  and	  applica2ons	  
•  The	  role	  of	  cryptography	  
•  Types	  of	  cryptographic	  algorithms	  
»  Hash	  funcBons	  
»  Secret	  key	  cryptography	  
»  Public	  key	  cryptography	  
•  PuYng	  them	  altogether...	  case	  studies	  in	  
cryptography	  
•  Trust	  models	  
»  CerBficates	  
»  Sample	  applicaBons:	  SSL,	  personal	  cerBficates	  
The	  Role	  of	  Cryptography	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  ©	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  Kessler	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Cryptography	  
•  The	  science	  of	  wriBng	  in	  secret	  codes	  
» Dates	  back	  to	  1900	  B.C.	  in	  Egypt	  (non-­‐standard	  
hieroglyphics);	  probably	  appears	  
spontaneously	  soon	  aLer	  wriBng	  is	  developed	  
•  Historically,	  two	  types	  of	  cryptography:	  
»  SubsBtuBon	  
»  TransposiBon/PermutaBon	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SubsBtuBon	  Ciphers	  
• Most	  famous:	  Caesar's	  Cipher	  
»  ShiL	  each	  leDer	  to	  the	  right	  by	  3	  
•  Today:	  Rota2on	  13	  (ROT13)	  sBll	  found	  on	  
Unix	  systems	  and	  Usenet	  to	  hide	  offensive	  
text,	  puzzle	  soluBons,	  passwords,	  etc.	  
PLAIN: A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z 
rot13: n o p q r s t u v w x y z a b c d e f g h i j k l m 
5 
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TransposiBon	  Cipher	  
Columnar	  transposiBon	  cipher	  






 ciphertext:  cyea bric neys oinp amts tlpu iool svtt 
  eeeo mxdg dott farh olxy 
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Cryptography	  Today	  
•  Cryptography	  is	  necessary	  today	  in	  
telecommunicaBons	  when	  communicaBng	  
over	  any	  untrusted	  medium	  
•  Digital	  cryptography	  basically	  comes	  in	  
three	  varieBes:	  
» Hash	  funcBons	  (no	  key)	  
»  Secret	  key	  cryptography	  (one	  key)	  
» Public	  key	  cryptography	  (two	  keys)	  
6 
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Secure	  CommunicaBons	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Poll question #2 
7 
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Hash	  FuncBons	  
•  No	  key	  
»  Plaintext	  (and	  length	  of	  plaintext)	  is	  not	  recoverable	  from	  
the	  ciphertext	  
»  Examples:	  HMAC,	  MD2,	  MD4,	  MD5,	  RIPEMD-­‐160,	  SHA	  
»  Also	  called	  message	  digests	  or	  one-­‐way	  encryp2on	  
•  Primary	  use:	  Message	  integrity	  
plaintext	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ciphertext	  
hash	  func2on	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Clear-­‐text	  passwords	  is	  one	  good	  reason	  to	  image	  RAM!	  
8 
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SHA	  and	  MD5	  Hashing	  
15	  ©	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Hash	  Collisions	  
•  There	  are	  2K	  possible	  hash	  values	  (where	  K	  =	  hash	  
length)	  while	  there	  are	  an	  infinite	  number	  of	  files	  
»  Since	  ∞	  >>	  2K,	  there	  will	  be	  hash	  collisions	  
•  In	  fact,	  an	  infinite	  number	  of	  files	  will	  have	  the	  same	  hash!	  
•  The	  problem:	  Can	  hash	  collisions	  be	  forced?	  
»  What	  is	  the	  impact	  on	  informaBon	  security?	  
»  What	  is	  the	  impact	  on	  digital	  forensics?	  
•  SoluBons	  to	  collisions	  
»  Use	  longer	  hashes	  (e.g.,	  SHA-­‐256)	  
»  Use	  mulBple	  hashes	  (e.g.,	  MD5	  and	  SHA-­‐1)	  
Ref: http://www.garykessler.net/library/crypto.html#hash 
9 
Sidebar:	  Hashing	  and	  Imaging	  
•  There	  is	  an	  extraordinarily	  low	  probability	  that	  you	  
will	  find	  two	  different	  files	  with	  the	  same	  hash	  
»  ~1	  in	  1043	  
•  Hashes	  are	  the	  basis	  for	  Known	  File	  Filters	  when	  
searching	  for	  images	  of	  child	  pornography	  and	  for	  
P2P	  networks	  
•  Hashes	  are	  only	  one	  way	  in	  which	  you	  should	  
establish	  the	  correctness	  of	  your	  foresnic	  imaging	  
»  Experience,	  training,	  and	  valid	  tools	  (à	  la	  Fred	  Cohen)	  
16	  ©	  1998-­‐2012,	  Gary	  C.	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What	  About	  Hashed	  Passwords?	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Using	  2a9e402f3b2a4db8826606d527a27609,	  the	  MD5	  hash	  of	  a	  disk	  drive.	  
10 
Secret	  Key	  Cryptography	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Secret	  Key	  Cryptography	  
•  Single	  key	  (symmetric	  cryptography)	  
»  Same	  key	  is	  used	  for	  encrypBon	  and	  decrypBon	  
»  Examples:	  AES,	  DES,	  IDEA,	  3DES,	  RC4,	  RC5,	  CAST,	  
Blowfish,	  Twofish	  
•  Primary	  use:	  Privacy	  
plaintext	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ciphertext	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  plaintext	  
11 
20	  ©	  1998-­‐2012,	  Gary	  C.	  Kessler	  
	  	  	  	  DES	  
•  Designed	  to	  be	  fast	  in	  
hardware,	  slow	  in	  
soLware,	  resistant	  to	  
various	  aDacks	  
•  Block	  cipher	  using	  56-­‐bit	  
key	  and	  64-­‐bit	  blocks	  
•  56-­‐bit	  key	  expanded	  to	  64	  
bits	  using	  parity	  
•  Ki	  is	  a	  48-­‐bit	  value	  derived	  
from	  64-­‐bit	  key	  
•  FIPS	  46-­‐2/ANS	  X3.92	  
describes	  enBre	  process	  
21	  ©	  1998-­‐2012,	  Gary	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A	  Few	  Words	  About	  DES...	  
•  DES	  introduced	  in	  1977	  
»  Proposed	  by	  IBM	  with	  56-­‐	  or	  128-­‐bit	  key;	  NSA	  adopted	  
56-­‐bit	  key	  
•  March	  1998,	  U.S.	  Gov't.	  sBll	  claims	  that	  DES	  is	  
safe	  from	  aDack...	  
»  July	  1998,	  EFF	  introduces	  DES	  cracker	  designed	  for	  
$220K;	  can	  break	  keys	  in	  average	  4.5	  days	  
»  For	  $1M,	  could	  break	  DES	  keys	  in	  average	  <22	  hours	  
•  We	  care	  because	  DES	  is	  the	  most	  widely	  used	  
crypto	  scheme	  in	  the	  financial	  industry!!	  
12 
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Breaking	  DES	  
•  DES	  Challenge	  I	  (3/97)	  
»  84	  days	  using	  thousands	  of	  
computers	  
•  DES	  Challenge	  II	  (1998)	  
»  distributed.net	  (40	  days)	  
»  EFF	  Deep	  Crack	  (3	  days)	  
•  DES	  Challenge	  III	  (1/99)	  
»  distributed.net	  and	  Deep	  
Crack	  (<1	  day)	  
23	  ©	  1998-­‐2012,	  Gary	  C.	  Kessler	  
Advanced	  EncrypBon	  Standard	  
•  NIST's	  next-­‐generaBon	  SKC	  
»  Open	  process	  
»  InternaBonal	  "compeBBon"	  
•  Process	  started	  1997,	  decision	  2001	  
•  Rijndael	  
»  Employs	  128-­‐,	  192-­‐,	  or	  256-­‐bit	  key	  on	  a	  128-­‐,	  192-­‐,	  or	  
256-­‐bit	  block	  
•  AES	  only	  uses	  a	  128-­‐bit	  block	  size	  
»  SelecBon	  criteria	  included	  general	  security	  features,	  
security	  implementaBon,	  soLware	  performance,	  smart	  
card	  performance,	  hardware	  performance,	  and	  design	  
features	  
13 
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hMp://www.aescrypt.com/	  
25	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Key	  Length	  and	  SKC	  
	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  Time	  Per 	  Key	  Length	  
	   	   	   	  Recovered	  Key 	  For	  Protec)on	  
AMacker 	   	  Budget 	  Tool 	  40-­‐bit 	  56-­‐bit 	  In	  Late-­‐1995	  
Pedestrian	  hacker 	  Tiny 	  PC 	  1	  week 	  Never 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  
	   	  $400 	  FPGA 	  5	  hours 	  38	  years 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  
Small	  business 	  $10K 	  FPGA 	  12	  min. 	  18	  mon. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	  
Corporate	  Dept. 	  $300K 	  FPGA 	  24	  sec. 	  19	  days 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60	  
	   	   	  ASIC 	  0.18	  sec. 	  3	  hours	  
Big	  Company 	  $10M 	  FPGA 	  7	  sec. 	  13	  hours 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  70	  
	   	   	  ASIC 	  5	  ms 	  6	  min.	  
Government 	  $300M 	  ASIC 	  0.2	  ms 	  12	  sec. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  75	  
ASIC	  =	  ApplicaBon-­‐specific	  integrated	  circuit	  
FPGA	  =	  Field	  programmable	  gate	  array	  
Source:	  Blaze,	  et	  al.,	  1996	  
14 
Public	  Key	  Cryptography	  
26	  ©	  1998-­‐2012,	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  C.	  Kessler	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Public	  Key	  Cryptography	  
•  Two	  keys	  (asymmetric	  cryptography)	  
»  One	  key	  is	  used	  for	  encrypBon,	  the	  other	  for	  decrypBon	  
»  The	  two	  keys	  are	  related	  mathemaBcally	  but	  knowledge	  of	  
one	  key	  does	  not	  easily	  yield	  knowledge	  of	  the	  other	  key	  
»  Examples:	  RSA,	  DSA,	  Diffie-­‐Hellman,	  ECC,	  ElGamal	  
•  Primary	  uses:	  AuthenBcaBon,	  non-­‐repudiaBon,	  key	  
exchange	  (but	  invented	  for	  bulk	  encrypBon)	  
plaintext	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ciphertext	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  plaintext	  
15 
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PKC	  
•  All	  PKC	  based	  on	  some	  mathemaBcal	  funcBon	  that	  
is	  easy	  but	  where	  the	  inverse	  is	  hard	  
»  E.g.,	  exponenBaBon	  vs.	  logarithms,	  mulBplicaBon	  vs.	  
factorizaBon	  
•  Actual	  inven2on	  is	  unclear...	  
»  NSA,	  1966	  (no	  proof)	  
»  U.K.	  Gov't.	  CommunicaBon	  Headquarters,	  1969	  
(classified	  unBl	  1990s)	  
»  Merkle's	  Puzzles	  (claim	  1974,	  pub.	  1978)	  
»  Diffie	  &	  Hellman	  (pub.	  1976)	  
29	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Diffie-­‐Hellman	  Key	  Exchange	  
Alice	  and	  Bob	  agree	  on	  the	  value	  of	  a	  large	  prime	  number,	  N	  and	  a	  generator,	  
G.	  Each	  calculates	  a	  private	  key	  (X)	  and	  public	  key	  (Y).	  The	  secret	  key	  (K)	  is	  
derived	  from	  X	  and	  the	  other	  person's	  Y.	  
Select	  N=7,	  G=4	  
Choose	  XA=2	  
YA	  =	  GXA	  mod	  N	  
	  	  	  	  	  =	  42	  mod	  7	  
	  	  	  	  	  =	  2	  
KA	  =	  YBXA	  mod	  N	  
	  	  	  	  	  =	  12	  mod	  7	  
	  	  	  	  	  =	  1	  
Choose	  XB=3	  
YB	  =	  GXB	  mod	  N	  
	  	  	  	  	  =	  43	  mod	  7	  
	  	  	  	  	  =	  1	  
KB	  =	  YAXB	  mod	  N	  
	  	  	  	  	  =	  23	  mod	  7	  
	  	  	  	  	  =	  1	  Secret	  Key	  
16 
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RSA	  MathemaBcs	  
•  Create	  private/public	  key	  
pair:	  
»  Choose	  2	  primes,	  p	  &	  q	  
»  Modulus	  n	  =	  pq	  
»  Select	  public	  exponent	  e,	  
relaBvely	  prime	  to	  (p-­‐1)(q-­‐1)	  
»  Calculate	  private	  exponent	  d	  
=	  (ed-­‐1)/[(p-­‐1)(q-­‐1)]	  
•  To	  encrypt	  message	  M	  
with	  public	  key:	  
»  C	  =	  Me	  mod	  n	  
•  To	  decrypt	  ciphertext	  
C	  with	  private	  key:	  
»  M	  =	  Cd	  mod	  n	  
•  Of	  course,	  either	  key	  
can	  be	  used	  first...	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RSA	  Example	  
•  Select	  p=3,	  q=5	  
•  n	  =	  pq	  =	  15	  
•  Choose	  e=11,	  
relaBvely	  prime	  to	  	  	  
(p-­‐1)(q-­‐1)	  =	  8	  
•  (11d-­‐1)/8	  must	  be	  an	  
integer;	  choose	  d=3	  
•  M	  =	  8384	  (0x8384)	  
•  Encrypt	  
»  Public	  key	  value	  is	  (e,n)	  =	  (11,15)	  
»  Ci	  =	  Mi11	  mod	  15	  
»  C	  =	  0x2c24	  
•  Decrypt	  
»  Private	  key	  value	  is	  (d,n)	  =	  (3,15)	  
»  Mi	  =	  Ci3	  mod	  15	  
»  M	  =	  0x8384	  
17 
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RSA	  ApplicaBon	  
ciphertext	  =	  PVTALICE	  (message)	  
ciphertext	  =	  PUBBOB	  (message)	  
Alice	  can	  sign	  messages	  by	  encryp)ng	  with	  her	  own	  private	  key;	  this	  
authen)cates	  that	  she	  sent	  the	  message	  
Alice	  can	  ensure	  that	  only	  Bob	  can	  read	  a	  message	  by	  encryp)ng	  with	  
his	  public	  key;	  this	  provides	  privacy	  and	  proves	  that	  Bob	  was	  the	  
intended	  receiver.	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EllipBc	  Curve	  Cryptography	  
•  First	  described	  in	  1985	  by	  two	  independent	  teams	  
•  Uses	  logarithms	  and	  hard-­‐to-­‐solve	  problems	  that	  
fall	  on	  an	  ellipBc	  curve	  
»  Because	  problems	  are	  harder	  to	  solve	  than	  factoring,	  
smaller	  keys	  yield	  beDer	  protecBon	  and	  faster	  
processing	  than	  RSA	  
•  Current	  uses:	  Smart	  cards,	  mobile	  devices,	  PDAs	  
»  Primary	  vendor	  is	  CerBcom	  
18 
34	  ©	  1998-­‐2012,	  Gary	  C.	  Kessler	  
The	  EllipBc	  Curve	  




The	  problem:	  Given	  two	  points,	  P	  
and	  Q,	  on	  an	  ellip)c	  curve,	  find	  
integer	  i	  ∍	  P=iQ.	  
• 	  Public	  key	  =	  iQ	  
• 	  Private	  key	  =	  i	  
Ellip)c	  curve	  consists	  of	  the	  set	  of	  
real	  numbers	  (x,y)	  that	  sa)sfy:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  y²	  =	  x³	  +	  ax	  +	  b	  
Small	  changes	  in	  a	  and	  b	  can	  
make	  major	  changes	  in	  the	  shape	  
of	  the	  curve	  and,	  therefore,	  the	  
set	  of	  (x,y)	  points	  that	  sa)sfy	  the	  
equa)on.	  
Sample	  Cryptosystems	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Poll question #3 
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Case	  Study:	  PGP	  Signatures	  
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- 
Hash: SHA1 
Hi Carol. 
What was that pithy Groucho Marx quote? 
/kess 
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- 





-----END PGP SIGNATURE----- 
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Case	  Study:	  PGP	  EncrypBon	  
-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE----- 
















-----END PGP MESSAGE----- 
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Case	  Study:	  Windows	  2000/XP	  EFS	  
•  EncrypBng	  File	  System	  (EFS)	  
»  When	  the	  file	  is	  saved	  to	  disk:	  
•  Random	  file	  encrypBon	  key	  (FEK)	  is	  created	  
•  File	  contents	  encrypted	  using	  FEK	  and	  encrypBon	  algorithm	  
–  Windows	  2000	  and	  XP	  default	  to	  DESX;	  XP	  also	  supports	  3DES	  
–  Windows	  XP	  SP1,	  Server	  2003,	  Vista,	  and	  Server	  2008	  default	  to	  AES;	  also	  
support	  DESX	  and	  3DES	  
–  Windows	  7	  and	  Server	  2008	  R2	  default	  to	  AES,	  SHA,	  and	  ECC;	  also	  support	  
DESX	  and	  3DES	  
•  FEK	  stored	  with	  file,	  encrypted	  with	  user's	  RSA	  public	  key	  (and,	  
opBonally,	  recovery	  agent's	  RSA	  public	  key)	  
»  When	  the	  file	  is	  opened:	  
•  FEK	  recovered	  for	  decrypBon	  using	  RSA	  private	  key,	  which	  can	  be	  
stored	  on	  external	  floppy	  disk	  or	  smart	  card	  
•  If	  private	  key	  lost,	  files	  may	  be	  accessed	  using	  RA's	  private	  key	  
•  Key	  Bed	  to	  username	  prior	  to	  Win	  XP	  SP2;	  now	  uses	  user	  
password	  
»  A	  pre-­‐encrypBon	  backup	  file	  is	  deleted	  aLer	  encrypBon	  
21 
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EFS	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The	  cipher	  command	  (Windows)	  
C:\> cipher /u /n 












C:\My Documents\Word\GKS\phish\Re Help with investigation.txt 
C:\>  
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Whole	  Disk	  EncrypBon	  (WDE)	  
•  WDE	  encrypts	  enBre	  drive	  
»  WDE	  modifies	  boot	  sector	  0	  to	  go	  to	  alternate	  loader	  
»  Files	  are	  available	  to	  user	  aLer	  a	  password	  is	  entered	  when	  
logging	  on	  
•  Files	  are	  encrypted	  when	  viewed	  by	  forensics	  soLware	  if	  disk	  drive	  is	  
powered	  down	  
•  Some	  disk	  encrypBon	  soLware	  
»  Windows	  Vista	  
•  Full	  volume	  encrypBon;	  Vista	  encrypts	  data	  parBBon,	  but	  not	  boot	  
parBBon	  




•  A	  case	  for	  live	  forensics...	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Pre-­‐Boot	  Logon	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hDp://toorcon.techpathways.com/
uploads/zeroview.zip	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Windows	  Vista	  and	  Windows	  7	  
•  Vista	  and	  Win7	  encrypBon	  can	  cause	  
forensics	  examiners	  some	  problems...	  
» Hardware-­‐enabled	  full-­‐volume	  encrypBon	  
» Windows	  Vista	  Enterprise	  and	  UlBmate	  
• EncrypBon	  not	  on	  by	  default	  
» Use	  BitLocker	  drive	  encrypBon	  Bed	  to	  Trusted	  
Plaorm	  Module	  (TPM)	  chip	  or	  USB	  flash	  drive	  
for	  key	  storage	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Other	  Crypto	  Schemes	  
•  TrueCrypt	  
»  Open	  source	  encrypBon	  for	  Windows,	  
MacOS,	  or	  Linux	  
»  Virtual	  encrypted	  disk	  using	  AES,	  
Serpent,	  or	  Twofish	  
»  Can	  create	  hidden	  encrypted	  volume	  
»  First	  released	  in	  2004	  
•  FileVault	  
»  File	  encrypBon	  for	  Macs,	  using	  AES	  
»  Password	  derived	  from	  user's	  login	  
password	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Plausible	  Deniability	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Normal	  TrueCrypt	  volume	  







Data	  area	  for	  standard	  volume	  
Data	  area	  for	  standard	  volume	   Data	  area	  for	  hidden	  volume	  





•  JADsoLware's	  Encrypted	  Disk	  Detector	  
»  Tests	  for	  BitLocker,	  PGP,	  and	  TrueCrypt	  
encrypted	  drives	  and	  volumes	  (parBBons)	  
» hLp://www.jadsoOware.com/go/?page_id=167	  
50	  ©	  1998-­‐2012,	  Gary	  C.	  Kessler	  
Two	  physical	  drives,	  both	  with	  NTFS;	  
no	  encrypted	  volume.	  
Two	  physical	  drives.	  The	  first	  volume	  
uses	  NTFS	  and	  is	  not	  encrypted.	  The	  
second	  volume	  is	  detected	  as	  possibly	  
encrypted	  (in	  fact,	  it	  is	  a	  TrueCrypt	  
volume).	  
Screen	  shots	  from	  h@p://
www.jadsoEware.com/home/edd.htm	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Secure	  CommunicaBon	  Protocols	  
•  Secure	  MIME	  (S/MIME)	  
•  Secure	  Sockets	  Layer	  (SSL)	  
»  hDps,	  Lps,	  pops,	  smtps,	  ...	  
•  Secure	  Electronic	  TransacBons	  
(SET)	  
•  Secure	  HTTP	  (S-­‐HTTP)	  
•  TransacBon	  Internet	  Protocol	  
(TIP)	  
•  Simple	  AuthenBcaBon	  and	  
Security	  Layer	  (SASL)	  
•  PreDy	  Good	  Privacy	  (PGP)	  
•  IP	  Security	  Protocol	  (IPsec)	  
•  Kerberos	  
•  Server	  Gated	  Cryptography	  
(SGC)	  
•  Transport	  Layer	  Security	  (TLS)	  
•  Secure	  Shell	  (SSH)	  
•  AuthenBcated	  POP	  (APOP)	  
Do	  not	  trust	  “secret”	  cryptographic	  protocols	  (e.g.,	  Skipjack!).	  The	  
safety	  is	  in	  the	  choice	  (and	  length)	  of	  the	  key,	  not	  the	  secrecy	  of	  
the	  algorithm	  (Kerckhoffs'	  Principle,	  1883).	  
Sidebar:	  Other	  ConsideraBons	  
•  Poor	  implementaBon	  and/or	  management	  
of	  keys	  works	  in	  the	  invesBgator's	  favor!	  
» Unprotected	  files	  on	  the	  computer	  with	  
usernames/passwords	  
» Never	  underesBmate	  the	  value	  of	  a	  good	  
interview	  
• ParBcularly	  in	  the	  very	  early	  stages	  on	  scene	  
•  Think	  carefully	  before	  pulling	  the	  plug!!	  
»  EncrypBon	  is	  a	  case	  for	  live	  imaging	  in	  the	  field	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Trust	  in	  Cryptosystems	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Poll question #4 
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Trust	  Models	  
• When	  using	  cryptography,	  how	  can	  you	  
trust	  the	  enBty	  that	  gives	  you	  a	  key?	  
» PGP	  Web	  of	  trust	  
» Kerberos	  trusted	  server	  and	  SKC	  for	  a	  priori	  
relaBonships	  
» PKI	  trusted	  third	  parBes	  and	  PKC	  for	  anyone-­‐
to-­‐anyone	  communicaBon	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PGP	  Web	  of	  Trust	  











running	  AuthenBcaBon	  Server	  





1)	  Once	  per	  Kerberos	  session,	  client	  
connects	  to	  AS	  to	  obtain	  TGS	  session	  
key	  and	  )cket-­‐gran)ng	  )cket	  (TGT).	  
2)	  Once	  per	  applica)on	  session,	  client	  
connects	  to	  TGS	  to	  obtain	  applica)on	  
session	  key	  (ASK)	  &	  applica)on	  
server's	  secret	  key.	  
3)	  The	  authen)cated	  client	  sends	  its	  )cket,	  ASK,	  &	  
encrypted	  applica)on	  server's	  secret	  key	  to	  
Applica)on	  Server,	  and	  ini)ates	  connec)on.	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Public	  Key	  Infrastructure	  
•  How	  can	  a	  party’s	  public	  key	  be	  found	  if	  not	  
known	  locally?	  Where	  is	  the	  key	  stored?	  
•  How	  does	  a	  recipient	  verify	  that	  a	  public	  key	  
really	  belongs	  to	  the	  sender	  and	  that	  it	  is	  
being	  used	  for	  a	  legiBmate	  purpose?	  
• When	  does	  a	  public	  key	  expire?	  
•  How	  can	  a	  key	  be	  revoked	  in	  case	  of	  loss	  or	  
compromise?	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CerBficates	  
•  Cer2ficates	  bind	  a	  public	  key	  to	  an	  individual,	  
posiBon,	  or	  other	  enBty,	  and	  provide	  
»  IdenBficaBon	  
»  ExpiraBon	  date	  
»  Issuing	  authority	  
»  Serial	  number	  
» Policies	  about	  how	  the	  user	  was	  idenBfied	  
»  LimitaBons	  on	  how	  the	  key	  may	  be	  used	  
X.509 v3 
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CerBficates	  in	  Real-­‐Life...	  
•  CerBficates	  idenBfy	  us,	  what	  we	  are	  
allowed	  to	  do,	  issuer,	  validity	  period,	  etc.	  
»  Driver’s	  license:	  Name,	  DOB,	  address,	  type	  of	  
vehicle,	  issuing	  state,	  valid	  period,	  serial	  number,	  
photo(?),	  organ	  donaBon(?)	  
»  Credit	  card:	  Name,	  serial	  number,	  valid	  period,	  
issuer	  
»  SCUBA	  cerBficaBon:	  Name,	  DOB,	  serial	  number,	  
level	  of	  training,	  cerBficaBon	  date,	  instructor,	  
issuing	  agency,	  photo(?)	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Sample	  Browser	  CerBficate	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Secure	  Sockets	  Layer	  
•  Originally	  developed	  by	  Netscape	  CommunicaBons	  
»  SSL	  v2.0	  (deprecated)	  and	  v3.0	  (weak)	  
»  Transport	  Layer	  Security	  (TLS)	  v1.0	  ~	  "SSL	  v3.1"	  (RFC	  2246)	  
•  TheoreBcal	  vulnerabilty	  described	  in	  2002	  made	  pracBcal	  in	  2011!	  
•  TLS	  v1.1	  (RFC	  4346)	  and	  TLS	  v1.2	  (RFC	  5246)	  
•  Provides	  privacy,	  integrity,	  client/server	  authenBcaBon	  
•  ApplicaBon-­‐independent	  
»  Can	  be	  used	  with	  HTTP,	  Telnet,	  FTP,	  NNTP,	  IMAP,	  POP3	  over	  TCP	  
»  Datagram	  TLS	  (v1.2,	  RFC	  6347)	  operates	  over	  UDP	  
•  Two	  main	  protocols	  
»  SSL	  Handshake	  Protocol	  (parameter	  negoBaBon)	  
»  SSL	  Record	  Protocol	  (data	  transfer)	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HTTP	  Over	  SSL	  






URL	  form:	  h@ps://www.example.com	  
SSL	   SSL	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*	  op2onal	  or	  situa2on-­‐dependent	  message	  
Client	  starts	  negoBaBon	  
with	  list	  of	  SSL	  version(s)	  
and	  encrypBon	  opBons,	  
and	  random	  session	  
number.	  
Client	  sends	  cerBficate	  
and/or	  secret	  key;	  
may	  verify	  cerBficate.	  
Client	  changes	  to	  agreed	  
encrypBon	  scheme.	  
DATA	  EXCHANGE	  
Server	  responds	  with	  	  
highest	  SSL	  version	  and	  
strongest	  mutual	  
encrypBon	  opBon;	  
sends	  public	  key	  
cerBficate	  and/or	  secret	  
key.	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LimitaBons	  of	  PKI	  
•  A	  digital	  signature	  does	  not	  prove	  that	  Alice	  
signed	  a	  message,	  but	  that	  her	  private	  key	  did	  
» Good	  cryptographic	  algorithms	  can	  be	  bypassed	  
by	  viruses,	  malicious	  code,	  abuse/misuse	  by	  
users,	  and	  other	  real-­‐world	  events	  
•  Users	  do	  not	  generally	  check	  the	  source	  or	  
validity	  of	  received	  cerBficates	  
34 
Summary	  and	  Closure!	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DetecBng	  EncrypBon	  
•  Cryptography	  provides	  secret	  
communicaBon	  but	  not	  necessarily	  hidden	  
» Use	  of	  crypto	  does	  not	  form	  a	  covert	  
communicaBons	  channel	  
»  Encrypted	  messages	  and	  files	  can	  be	  detected	  
by	  a	  third	  party	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35 
Example	  DetecBon	  StaBsBcs	  (FTK)	  
•  Most	  encrypBon	  detecBon	  schemes	  are	  tesBng	  for	  
randomness;	  high	  randomness	  suggests	  use	  of	  encrypBon	  
»  Arithme2c	  Mean:	  Calculated	  by	  summing	  all	  of	  the	  bytes	  in	  a	  file	  
and	  dividing	  by	  the	  file	  length;	  if	  random,	  the	  value	  should	  be	  
~1.75.	  
»  Chi-­‐Squared	  Error	  Percent:	  This	  distribuBon	  is	  calculated	  for	  a	  byte	  
stream	  in	  a	  file;	  the	  value	  indicates	  how	  frequently	  a	  truly	  random	  
number	  would	  exceed	  the	  calculated	  value.	  
»  Entropy:	  Describes	  the	  informaBon	  density	  (per	  Shannon)	  of	  a	  file	  
in	  bits/character;	  as	  entropy-­‐-­‐>8,	  there	  is	  more	  randomness.	  
»  MCPI	  Error	  Percent:	  The	  Monte	  Carlo	  algorithm	  uses	  staBsBcal	  
techniques	  to	  approximate	  the	  value	  of	  π;	  A	  high	  error	  rate	  
implies	  more	  randomness.	  
»  Serial	  Correla2on	  Coefficient:	  Indicates	  the	  amount	  to	  which	  each	  
byte	  is	  an	  e-­‐mail	  relies	  on	  the	  previous	  byte.	  A	  value	  close	  to	  0	  
indicates	  randomness.	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Crypto	  ADack	  Methods	  
•  Password	  guessing	  
•  Known	  plaintext	  
•  Chosen	  plaintext	  
•  Known	  ciphertext	  
•  DicBonary	  aDack	  
•  Brute	  force	  aDack	  
•  Side	  channel	  aDacks	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36 
Crypto	  Breaking	  Tools	  
•  Rainbow	  tables	  
•  distributed.net	  
•  Rack	  aDack	  
•  Passware	  
•  ElcomSoL	  
»  Password	  Recovery	  
Bundle	  
•  AccessData	  
»  Password	  Recovery	  
Toolkit	  (PRTK)	  
»  Distributed	  Network	  
ADack	  (DNA)	  
»  Portable	  Office	  Rainbow	  
Table	  (PORT)	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Acronyms	  and	  AbbreviaBons	  
3DES 	  Triple	  DES	  
AES 	  Advanced	  EncrypBon	  Standard	  (NIST)	  
ANS 	  American	  NaBonal	  Standard	  
CA 	  CerBficate	  authority	  
CPS 	  CerBficaBon	  pracBce	  statement	  
CRL 	  CerBficate	  RevocaBon	  List	  
DES 	  Data	  EncrypBon	  Standard	  
DOB 	  Date	  of	  birth	  
DoS 	  Denial	  of	  service	  
DSA 	  Digital	  Signature	  Algorithm	  (NIST)	  
ECC 	  EllipBc	  Curve	  Cryptography	  
EFF 	  Electronic	  FronBer	  FoundaBon	  
EFS 	  EncrypBng	  File	  System	  (W2K)	  
FIPS 	  Federal	  InformaBon	  Processing	  Standard	  
FTP 	  File	  Transfer	  Protocol	  (IETF)	  
HMAC 	  Hashed	  message	  authenBcaBon	  code	  
HTTP 	  Hypertext	  Transfer	  Protocol	  (IETF)	  
hDps 	  HTTP	  over	  SSL	  
IDEA 	  InternaBonal	  Data	  EncrypBon	  Algorithm	  
IE 	  Internet	  Explorer	  (MS)	  
IETF 	  Internet	  Engineering	  Task	  Force	  
IMAP 	  Internet	  Message	  Access	  Protocol	  (IETF)	  
ISP 	  Internet	  service	  provider	  
ITU-­‐T 	  InternaBonal	  TelecommunicaBon	  Union,	  
	  TelecommunicaBon	  StandardizaBon	  Sector	  
IV 	  IniBal	  vector	  
MAC 	  Message	  authenBcaBon	  code	  
MD2/4/5 	  Message	  Digest	  2,	  4,	  &	  5	  
MIPS 	  Millions	  of	  instrucBons	  per	  second	  
MS 	  MicrosoL	  
NIST 	  NaBonal	  InsBtute	  of	  Standards	  and	  
	  Technology	  
NNTP 	  Network	  News	  Transport	  Protocol	  (IETF)	  
NSA 	  NaBonal	  Security	  Agency	  
OS 	  OperaBng	  system	  
PDA 	  Personal	  digital	  assistant	  
PGP 	  PreDy	  Good	  Privacy	  
PKC 	  Public	  key	  cryptography	  
PKI 	  Public	  key	  infrastructure	  
POP 	  Post	  Office	  Protocol	  (IETF)	  
RA 	  RegistraBon	  Authority	  
RC2/4/5 	  Rivest	  Cipher	  (or	  Ron's	  Code)	  2,	  4,	  and	  5	  
RFC 	  Request	  for	  Comments	  (IETF)	  
RSA 	  Rivest,	  Shamir,	  Adleman	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Acronyms	  and	  AbbreviaBons	  (cont.)	  
SCUBA 	  Self-­‐contained	  underwater	  breathing	  
	  apparatus	  
SHA 	  Secure	  Hash	  Algorithm	  (NIST)	  
SKC 	  Secret-­‐key	  cryptography	  
SSL 	  Secure	  Sockets	  Layer	  (Netscape)	  
TCP 	  Transmission	  Control	  Protocol	  (IETF)	  
TLS 	  Transport	  Layer	  Security	  (IETF)	  
URL 	  Uniform	  Resource	  Locator	  
WDE 	  Whole	  disk	  encrypBon	  
W2K 	  Windows	  2000	  (MS)	  
XOR 	  Exclusive	  OR	  
39 
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QuesBons?	  Comments?	  Queries?	  
